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Abstract
The hypothesis that, on average, people accurately estimate probabilities in
random walk processes is experimentally investigated. Individuals are confronted
with a process that starts with $X , and in every stage either goes up or down by $1,
with probabilities p and 1−p respectively. For different values of p, individuals were
asked to estimate what is the chance that after 10 stages the system will be at a
point higher than or equal to $X . Systematic mistakes in estimations were observed.
In particular, estimations were centered around the stage-by-stage probability (p)
rather then around the actual probability. Implication of this result to random walk
processes in finance is considered.
∗We wish to thank Eric van Damme, Martin Dufwenberg, Bas Werker, and Jenke ter Horst for helpful
comments.




There is a large psychological literature concerning the way individuals estimate proba-
bilities. In particular, many systematic biases are documented [see e.g. the book edited
by Kahneman et al. (1982)]. The relevance of these studies to economic problems is not
always clear. In this paper we consider probability estimation in random walk processes.
These type of processes are of great importance in finance, since they are assumed to
describe price changes in so-called efficient markets (see section 4.2). Clearly, systematic
mistakes in probability estimation will lead to systematic mistakes in risk perception.
This may be helpful in understanding observations from real markets, and in developing
a better behavioral theory.
We experimentally investigate the following question:
How do people perceive risk in random walk processes?
In particular, we investigate whether people assess the probability of several outcomes
after n periods correctly, and if not, are the mistakes systematically ’optimistic’ (pes-
simistic), i.e. viewing the process as less (more) risky than it really is. At this point no
explicit definition of risk is given, it will be clear in the context of the experiment.
We use the following setup:
An investor is given a stock that is worth $X. Then a process of N stages
begins. In every stage, the price of the stock either goes up or down by $1,
with probability p and 1 − p respectively. If the price of the stock reaches $0
within N stages, then the stock will be worth $0 for ever.
Problem: What do you think is the probability that the stock will be worth at
least $X after N stages (pX)?
We investigated this game with p = 0.25, 0.33, 0.4, 0.6, 0.67, and 0.75. In all treatments
N = 10 and X = 3. 104 subjects participated, each presented with only one p. The
subjects were awarded according to the accuracy of their answers (see the Appendix).
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In the literature on probability assessment there is extensive discussion on problems
connected with applications of Bayesian methods. Relatively little has been done about
the practical problem of assessing prior distributions. Gneezy (1996) presented experi-
mental evidence from a process with similar rules, that ends when the price of the stock
reaches either $0 or $n (X < n), i.e. there is no limit on the number of stages, and in
principle the game may last forever. He tested this for p > .5, and found that individuals
systematically under-estimated the probability of ending up with $n (pn), rather then
with $0. In particular, ’anchoring’ heuristics was found: estimations did not differ much
from the stage-by-stage probability (’anchored’ to p). The under-estimations seemed to
be the result of the fact that when p > .5, pn > p.
This paper deals with a finite horizon. We also extend the investigation to p < .5,
in order to test whether, if estimation mistakes will be found, they will be in the same
direction for p < .5 as for p > .5 (i.e. over-estimation or underestimations for all p’s).
This is important because the anchoring heuristics gives a different prediction, namely it
suggests that for p > .5 individuals will under-estimate pX (because in that range p < pX),
and for p < .5 individuals will over-estimate pX (because in that range p > pX).
A less stylized set-up is discussed in Staël von Holstein (1970, Ch.10). He conducted
an experiment which concerned forecasts of the changes in buying prices over fourteen
day periods for twelve shares quoted on the Stockholm stock exchange. The experiment
was run for 10 sessions to enable a study of the effect of feedback. Subjects were asked to
state their probabilities for the following five events: 1) the buying price decreases more
than 3%, 2) the buying price decreases more than 1%, but at most 3%, 3) the buying
price changes at most 1%, 4) the buying price increases more than 1%, but at most 3%,
5) the buying price increases more than 3%. In total 72 subjects participated, some of
which were stock market experts, trained statisticians, and bankers. It turned out that
a ”naive” assessment strategy, based on historical data from the two years preceding the
experiment, had an average successes which was better than 92% of the subjects. We refer
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to this study although it is basically different from ours. It shows that even experts that
were given time to learn (the experiment repeated 10 times with the same subjects for
different periods) do not make good prediction of outcomes in real life situations. Other
studies about biases in the assessment of compound probabilities, are Bar Hillel (1973)
and Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses to be tested, illustrates
the computation of pX , and ends with describing the method used. Section 3 gives the
results, and section 4 contains some discussion of the results.
2 Hypotheses, computation of pX, and method
2.1 Hypotheses
A traditional assumption in finance is that even if, for bounded rationality reasons, not
all individuals estimate probabilities accurately, there are no systematic mistakes in the
estimations. So the benchmark hypothesis we use is:
H1: The median of the individuals’ estimations is pX .
Against this benchmark hypothesis, we test the hypotheses:
H2: For a given p, the majority of individuals over-estimate pX .
H3: For a given p, the majority of individuals under-estimate pX .
Finally, we test the anchoring hypothesis:
H4: The median of the answers is the stage-by-stage probability p.
2.2 Computation of pX
To calculate pX we define the transition probability matrix P with elements pij :
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P = [pij], i, j = 1, 2, . . . , X +N + 1,
where the elements pij are given by
pij =

1 if i = j = 1,
p if i = 2, . . . , X +N, and j = i+ 1,
1− p if i = 2, . . . , X +N + 1, and j = i− 1,
0 otherwise.
If we define q ≡ 1− p, then P can be written as
P =






. . . . . . . . .
q 0 p
0 . . . q 0

Note that it is enough to have X + N + 1 rows, since after N stages the stock can be
worth at most $(X +N). The probabilities of reaching a value of $j (j = 0, . . . , X + N)
after N stages, when the starting amount is equal to $X, can be found in the (X + 1)-th






We fixed X = 3 and had 6 treatments, with the stage-by-stage probability (p) of 0.25,
0.33, 0.40, 0.60, 0.67, 0.75 in treatment 1, . . . , 6 respectively. Altogether 104 subjects
participated: 18, 15, 18, 17, 18, 18 in treatment 1, . . . , 6 respectively. Subjects were first-
year students in economics at the second semester of their studies. Most of them had
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participated successfully in a basic statistic course. After a short introduction, subjects
received the instruction (see the Appendix for the instructions for treatment 1). The
answers of subjects were evaluated and rewarded as described in the instructions. The
experiment took 20 minutes (excluding the paying time).
3 Results
The answers given by the subjects are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 : Data for the six different stage-by-stage
probabilities; p = stage-by-stage probability and
pX = compound probability.
p 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.75
pX 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.96
nr. obs. 18 15 18 17 18 18
.02 .04 .03 .35 .04 .04
.05 .05 .04 .53 .33 .50
.05 .08 .05 .55 .47 .50
.06 .15 .05 .60 .50 .50
.07 .15 .13 .60 .52 .62
.10 .15 .20 .60 .60 .65
.14 .20 .24 .66 .65 .65
.15 .21 .25 .70 .65 .70
.17 .22 .35 .75 .66 .73
.19 .30 .38 .77 .67 .75
.20 .49 .40 .80 .67 .80
.25 .63 .48 .80 .68 .80
.34 .65 .53 .80 .75 .83
.85 .67 .65 .80 .80 .84
.89 .90 .65 .80 .87 .90
.90 .70 .85 .95 .90
.93 .90 .85 .97 .90
.99 .95 1.00 .99
We first test the benchmark hypothesis (H1). It is not wise to use a test based upon the
mean of the observations, since this test will be very sensitive to outliers (in particular
6
with this kind of number of observations, see e.g. Hampel et al., 1986). A sign test
is an alternative. 1 Under H1, the number of individuals that under-estimates should
equal the number of individuals that over-estimates the compound probability pX . From
Table 2 we can see that hypothesis H1 is rejected for p = 0.25, 0.67, and 0.75, and is not
rejected for p = 0.33, 0.40, and 0.60 (we reject H1 when one of the two probabilities is
lower than 2.5%). 2 We should note that for p = 0.25 there are some (unreasonable) high
answers. This might be caused by a misunderstanding of the question. If we drop these
observations from the analysis, the number of underestimations is still larger than the
number of overestimation, but the result is not significant anymore.
When H1 is rejected, we then test whether H2 or H3 will be rejected. In the case of
p = 0.25, we cannot reject hypothesis H2, but hypothesis H3 is rejected. For p = 0.67
and p = 0.75, H2 is rejected, but H3 is not rejected (see Table 2).
Table 2 : Significance probabilities corresponding to H1
(and H2 and H3).
X: number of respondents that underestimates pX
r: realization
p 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.75
pX 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.96
r 4 6 8 10 15 17
P{ X ≤ r } 0.0245 0.304 0.407 0.834 0.999 1.000
P{ X ≥ r } 0.994 0.849 0.760 0.315 3.77E-3 7.25E-5
Let’s now consider the hypothesis H4. Again, we use a sign test: under H4, the number
of individuals that give an answer below p equals the number of individuals that give
an answer above p. From Table 3 we see that, for all treatments, we cannot reject
hypothesis H4, i.e. estimations are centered around p (significance level is 2 × 2.5%).
1Under the null hypothesis, the number of respondents that underestimates pX follows a binomial
distribution B(n, q) with parameters n equal to the number of observations and q equal to 1
2
.
2For p = 0.25 one respondent gave the exact answer. In that case the test is based upon the answers
different from pX (conditional sign test).
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Table 3 : Significance probabilities corresponding to H4.
X: number of respondents that underestimates p
r: realization
p 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.60 0.67 0.75
pX 0.07 0.19 0.33 0.78 0.89 0.96
r 11 10 10 3 9 9
P{ X ≤ r } 0.928 0.941 0.834 0.0287 0.773 0.685
P{ X ≥ r } 0.166 0.151 0.315 0.994 0.402 0.500
In Figure 1 we graphically illustrate what we just found. The the guesses of pX are plotted
for each treatment, together with the actual pX as a function of p.
Figure 1 : Graphical representation of the guesses of pX for each
treatment together with the stage-by-stage probability (p, dashed
line) and the compound probability (pX , solid line). The ’o’ corre-
sponds with one observation, ’+’ with two, ’*’ with three and ’x’
corresponds with five observations.















As can be seen from this figure, for p = 0.25, 0.33, and 0.40, we have pX < p, and for
p = 0.60, 0.67, and 0.75 we have pX > p. Since, as shown above, estimations are ’centered’
around p and not around pX , it is not surprising that in cases where pX < p the fraction
of under-estimations is smaller than 0.5, and when pX > p it is larger than 0.5.
4 Discussion
It is difficult to extrapolate the experience from laboratory experiments to real life situ-
ations. For example, it may be that the deviation of estimations from the bench mark
compound probability is due to the difficulty of the assessment task. It could also be that
subjects were inexperienced in the task of quantifying judgment in probabilistic terms.
However, the task in the experiment is certainly less difficult than in real life problems,
such as risk assessment in stock markets. The fact that the stage-by-stage probability
was given reduces one degree of difficulty compared with real markets. The fact that a
short period was used (N = 10) reduces another. We showed that even though subjects
were familiar with basic statistics, it seems that their knowledge was not quite useful to
the problem presented in the experiment.
It is shown in the experiment that the fraction of under- estimations increases in the
stage-by-stage probability. The median of the estimations for low p’s lies above pX , and
the median of the estimations for high p’s lies below pX . Moreover, it is shown that for
all tested p’s, estimations are centered around p. This is argued to cause the systematic
mistakes in the assessment of pX .
Finally we will consider two points of view about the results presented in this paper,
namely a psychological point of view and an economic point of view.
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4.1 Psychological point of view
Many tasks in life demand the use of heuristics, rather than explicit calculations. As
shown e.g. by Kahneman et al. (1982), people often use heuristics that lead to biases
in assessments. In this paper we consider the assessment of probabilities in random
walk processes, which are claimed to mimic some features of real financial markets. We
finger out a heuristics that is used by people in assessing compound probabilities in
these kind of set-ups, namely anchoring to the given stage-by-stage probability. This
heuristics improved the estimations compared with having estimations that are uniformly
distributed in the interval (0, 1). An important observation is that although people use
’wrong’ heuristics, it seems to us that in the process of teaching students, virtually all the
attention is given to developing their skills in solving problems analytically. We believe
that not enough attention is given to the development of ’heuristic skill’, e.g. the marginal
contribution for an MBA student of a course which tries to develop heuristic skills may be
very high. The first step in developing such heuristic skills is to understand the heuristics
people use, and when they should be improved. In this paper we indicate one important
situation in which an improvement is needed.
4.2 Economical point of view
One of the most important hypotheses which has evolved from the research of finan-
cial markets, and has been empirically investigated, is the efficient markets hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, financial markets are ’efficient’, and prices should reflect
a rational forecast of the present value of future dividend payment. The efficient mar-
ket hypothesis has also been traditionally associated with the assertion that future price
changes are unpredictable, although stock prices have a positive drift, see De Bondt and
Thaler (1989, p.189). The arbitrage forces are supposed to guarantee that prices adjust,
and then move again, randomly, in response to unpredictable events. In a classical exam-
ple, Fama (1965, p.98) writes: ”It seems safe to say that this paper has presented strong
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and voluminous evidence in favor of the random walk hypothesis.” Of course, this does
not imply that all stocks follow the same random walk. The future prospects of stocks
may still differ. These future prospects may create different random walk processes for
different stocks. Looking n periods into the future, different processes typically imply
different probability distribution over prices. Investors are assumed to have a preference
relation over these probability distributions. A common assumption about this preference
relation is that investors are risk averse, i.e. when comparing two processes with the same
expected return, they prefer the stock that is ”less risky”. The state of the art today is
the belief that only to a first approximation, financial markets follow a random walk. For
an elaborate discussion of the efficient market and random walk hypothesis, see De Bondt
and Thaler (1989), Fama (1991).
The assumption that returns on stocks follow a random walk with positive drift, can
be compared with p > .5 in our study. If, in real markets, investors under-estimate the
compound probability of a stock to come up ahead after a few periods (like we show in
our stylized example), they will regard the stock as riskier than it really is. That may
be a partial explanation of the equity premium puzzle. The puzzle refers to the fact that
over the last century the risk-return relationship has been so much more favorable for
stocks than for bonds, that unreasonably high level of risk aversion would be needed to
explain why investors are willing to hold bonds at all (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Could
it be the case that it is not the level of risk aversion that is ’wrong’, rather it is a case
of misjudgment of risk? 3 It may be, as Arrow (1982) argues, that evidence of bounded
rationality which is found in many cases in stylized experimental work, may teach us
about risk perception in complex financial markets. It could also be the case that, like is
commonly argued by economists, that even when individuals make systematic mistakes
markets are not biased (see e.g. Camerer 1987). This we would like to investigate in
future research.




Welcome to our experiment in decision theory. In the experiment you will be present-
ed with a problem, and asked to estimate the chance of a certain outcome. The more
accurate your estimation will be, the more money you will earn. After you will finish
answering we will pay you according to the following rule:
You will start with f 20, and for every 1% of mistake, f 1 will be deduced from your
payoff. The mistake is the absolute value of [your guess (in percentages) minus the actual
chance].
For example, if you will guess accurately, you will get f 20. If you will make a 10%
mistake (either over-estimate or under-estimate), you will get f 10. If your mistake will
be bigger or equal to 20% you will not be paid at all.
The problem is based on the following: Mr. X is given a stock that is worth f 3 to-
day. He will hold the stock for 10 years. In each year, the price of the stock either goes
up or down by f 1. The chance of it going up is 2/3 (i.e. 67%), and the chance of it going
down is 1/3 (i.e. 33%). So, after the first year, the stock will be worth either f 2 (with
33% chance) or f 4 (with 67% chance). In the second year, again, the price of the stock
will either go up or down by f 1, with the same chances, and so on. If the price of the
stock will reach f 0 within the 10 years, then the stock will be worthless for all future
periods. Otherwise, Mr. X will sell the stock after 10 years.
The problem :
What do you think is the chance that the price of the stock after 10 years will be at
least f 3? .............%
After all of you will finish answering, we will collect and check the answers, and pay
you as described above.
Do you have any questions?
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